February 25, 2005
In 2004 the winner-take-all system of U.S. electoral politics againproved an obstacle to genuine democracy. While progressives found little to get excited about in the John Kerry campaign, there were no viable third-party candidates, leaving them without a fully satisfying choice at the ballot box, even if most of us ended up voting for Kerry as a
statement against Bush. More important, there was no candidate whose
campaign offered progressives the opportunity to develop a real
political/electoral base that could move us closer to building power and
influence.
The most recent campaign that held that kind of promise was the Rainbow
insurgency of the 1980s, including the 1984 and '88 presidential
campaigns of the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, and the building of the National
Rainbow Coalition.
The Rainbow movement and candidacies have much to teach us today. While
the Rev. Jesse Jackson was a charismatic leader, the Rainbow Coalition
movement and the Jackson presidential campaigns were about far more than
Jesse Jackson. The approach that Jackson advanced - building an
organization and campaign both inside and outside the Democratic Party -
points progressives in the direction we should be moving now.
The political emergence of Jackson took place within the context of a
larger, black-led electoral upsurge that witnessed campaigns such as the
successful Harold Washington run for mayor of Chicago and the
unsuccessful but no less inspiring Mel King campaign for mayor of
Boston. Those campaigns were not only a reaction to the early years of
the Reagan/Bush administration and its economic attacks on working
people and veiled attacks on people of color but an outgrowth of the
movement for black political power that emerged in response to the
unfulfilled promise of the civil rights victories two decades earlier.
Jackson seized the moment to speak nationally on behalf of these
movements, but he did something even more important than that. He
articulated a political vision that, while based on the African-American
experience, did not represent solely a "black candidacy" or "black
politics." Jackson tapped into a growing anger and frustration arising
on the U.S. political scene among both historically and newly
disenfranchised populations. He spoke to issues of economic injustice
without abandoning the question of race, thus avoiding the classic error
of white populists who attempt to build unity by addressing economic
issues only. Jackson linked these issues. His appearances before white
farmers and workers brought forth a response that previously had been
unimaginable.
Jackson tapped into three key constituencies in order to build and
anchor both the Rainbow and his 1984 and '88 candidacies: the
African-American political establishment, African-American religious
institutions (including both Muslim and Christian denominations) and the
left. These constituencies had differing, though often overlapping,
agendas, which inevitably led to both vibrancy and tensions within the
movement. No one expected Jackson to receive the Democratic Party
nomination, let alone win the presidency, but the power of the movement
and the potential for something longer-lasting signaled the importance
of this initiative [for a full discussion of the Rainbow Coalition and
candidacies, see JoAnn Wypijewski, "The Rainbow's Gravity," Aug. 2,
2004].
Of course, it's also important to remember how the movement unraveled
after the fateful gathering of the Rainbow Coalition's executive board
in March 1989, largely because of Jackson's move to turn the coalition -
the core of his movement - into a personal political operation. There is
a lesson in this, too: Progressives should beware the charismatic leader
who defines movement loyalty as personal loyalty to him- or herself
rather than to the movement and its objectives.
After the Rainbow
In the wake of what we would describe as Jackson's coup against himself,
alternative views and strategies toward progressive electoral and mass
initiatives began to surface. For example, former Texas agricultural
commissioner Jim Hightower proposed a "Democratic-Populist Alliance" to
fill the void left by the collapse of the Jackson Rainbow; the late
trade union leader Tony Mazzocchi founded the Labor Party; through the
New Party, Dan Cantor and Joel Rogers advocated a fusion approach to
politics - later undermined by a Supreme Court decision in 1997 -
whereby independent parties could achieve power by cross-endorsing
major-party candidates; former National Rainbow Coalition executive
director Ron Daniels campaigned as an independent for the presidency in
1992; and the Green Party emerged at the local level, mounting
successful runs for municipal and county positions on a progressive
platform.
These initiatives, however worthy, had some problems in common. None of
them fully grasped the political moment, which was characterized by the
impact of the civil rights movement, the resistance to Reaganism and the
black-led electoral upsurge. With the exception of Daniels, they did not
understand the importance of race and the political movements of people
of color, and for the most part they lacked a base among communities of
color, thus denying them the moral authority Jackson and the Rainbow
possessed to challenge collective injustice in U.S. society. As a
result, they weren't able to build a united-front approach to politics.
Moreover, the post-Rainbow initiatives generally did not recognize and
embrace a central strategic conception of Jackson's: that success
depends on wielding power both within the Democratic Party and outside
it. The Rainbow as an independent effort was deeply unsettling to the
Democratic Party establishment (hence its successful effort to
discourage Jackson from running as an independent for the Senate in
South Carolina in 1984). At the same time, working inside the Democratic
Party troubles many people on the left, who have a quite justified
skepticism, if not antipathy, to the politics and practice of Democratic
Party officialdom. Nonetheless, it is this central strategic -
"inside/outside" - conception that must be revived and must serve as a
basis for the next round of progressive electoral politics.
A Neo-Rainbow Approach to Politics
The failure of most post-Rainbow electoral initiatives has led
progressives to do one of several things: (1) throw up their hands and
accept the terms of operation within the Democratic Party; (2) throw up
their hands and accept electoral marginalization through symbolic
electoral interventions, or else third-party races at the local level
that have yet to move national politics in a progressive direction; (3)
throw up their hands and abandon electoral politics in favor of "pure"
social action movements; or (4) just throw up.
Each of these tendencies reflects a degree of despair about the
possibilities of progressive political practice in the electoral arena.
Constructing such a practice is key to overcoming this despair and to
the creation of a sustained movement for substantive, even
transformative, politics in the United States. Despite the high degree
of abstention in the electoral arena, there is a deep belief that the
system should work, even if it does not. The immediate challenge is to
develop a progressive majoritarian bloc within the context of the
existing political system.
Taking up this strategic challenge means coming face to face with the
problem of the Democratic Party. As much as many progressives may wish
for the replacement of the party by a left/progressive party of
struggle, this is unlikely to happen in the near term. Independent
political parties have simply failed to ignite widespread populist
electoral activity. At the same time, no one should expect that the
Democratic Party will itself become the party of the dispossessed.
Instead, activists should look upon the Democratic Party as itself a
field of struggle. Such a view flows from a realization of the
undemocratic nature of the U.S. electoral system and the dilemmas that
creates. In this context, the fight must take place both within and
without the Democratic Party. To carry out such a struggle necessitates
organization, vision and strategy. It also needs the right core in order
to anchor it in reality and build the united front that such an effort
or insurgency must represent. We believe these to be the key parameters
for an effective neo-Rainbow electoral strategy.
It should be obvious, though it is often not, that discussions about a
neo-Rainbow electoral strategy are grounded in a desire to win political
power. Many of us on the left and progressive side of the aisle are so
accustomed to losing and existing under siege that the prospect of
winning is not only beyond our belief system but often scary. Winning
necessitates political alignments, compromises and often tactics that
are far from pure.
As we build this struggle, there are some pitfalls to avoid, such as
yoking it to a particular candidacy, which contributed to the Rainbow's
collapse. Congressman Dennis Kucinich's failed bid for the Democratic
nomination in 2004 suffered from the same problem. Lacking a powerful
and diverse core outside the candidate, Kucinich's campaign did not
become the vehicle for organization and political action it might have
been, particularly in light of his courageous anti-Iraq war stand.
Additionally, in shelving race in the name of economic justice, Kucinich
ran into the same problems most white populists do. Thus, while an
alternative electoral strategy will need strong candidates, it cannot
depend on one particular personality for its foundation.
What the Neo-Rainbow Needs
A neo-Rainbow electoral strategy needs: (1) to build an identifiable,
accountable organization that operates inside and outside the Democratic
Party; (2) to have people of color in its core leadership, and a base
among African-Americans and Latinos (not to the exclusion of others);
(3) to have a united-front approach to growth, encompassing diverse
constituencies; (4) to be pro-equality populist in its politics,
embracing the struggles for racial, gender and economic justice as the
cornerstones of democracy; (5) to support a change in U.S. foreign
policy toward what can be called a democratic foreign policy; (6) to
root itself among working people and their issues, and develop a
ground-up approach, involving ward and precinct organizations and a
targeted effort to build political power in key strategic zones.
Let's consider each of these elements of a neo-Rainbow strategy in turn:
Inside/outside. Drawing on the history of the Rainbow candidacies and
organization, as well as other efforts, such as the Non-Partisan Leagues
of the early 20th century, an inside/outside approach responds to the
actual political constraints of the U.S. electoral system. Contrary to
criticisms often raised by the ultra-"left," the failure of the Rainbow
movement lay not in following this strategy but in its inability to
build a democratic organization that was sufficiently rooted in social
movements and independent of one personality.
Working inside and outside the Democratic Party means establishing an
organization - not an independent political party but an independent
organization - that runs candidates in the Democratic primaries, runs in
nonpartisan elections and runs independently, all based on an assessment
of the actual situation rather than on a cookie-cutter format. Working
inside and outside the Democratic Party does not mean placing a great
deal of time and attention on occupying specific positions within the
Democratic Party itself. Decisions about whether such tactics make sense
need to be made with an eye to long-term political strategy.
The core. The Rainbow grew out of the black-led electoral upsurge of the
early 1980s. It was rooted in a movement. In addition, the core was
people of color who linked racial justice with broader social and
economic justice issues. Likewise, for any effective neo-Rainbow effort,
it is essential to have a core that not only represents the changing
demographics of the United States but also comes to the table
representing actual constituencies.
A united front. The approach toward activity and movement/organization
building must be that of a united front. Jesse Jackson's willingness and
ability to reach out to diverse constituencies was one of the most
admirable aspects of the Rainbow movement of the 1980s. In addition,
largely through the activities of the left, additional constituencies
were tapped, constituencies with which Jackson had little history.
Asians and Latinos, particularly, became integral to the campaigns and
movement.
Pro-equality populism. The politics of a neo-Rainbow initiative must be
pro-equality populist. This means having more than an anticorporate
message, as important as that is. It must be about more than class,
though rooted among working people and seeking the support of labor
unions. A movement that links the fights for racial, gender and economic
justice will resonate particularly, though not exclusively, with
communities of color.
Pro-equality populist politics is fundamentally about inclusion. Jackson
embodied this principle in the 1980s, for example in his open, public
embrace of gays and lesbians at a point when many, if not most,
traditional political leaders kept the gay community at arm's length.
Twenty-first-century pro-equality populism must be just as courageous
and as inclusive.
A democratic foreign policy. In light of the current international
situation and the aggressive, maniacal U.S. foreign policy - unchecked
by the generally spineless official Democratic Party - a neo-Rainbow
movement would need to articulate a compelling alternative vision of
international affairs and foreign policy. This democratic foreign policy
could be premised on multilateralism, mutual respect among nations,
nonmilitary methods of problem solving, the self-determination of
nations and opposition to U.S. interventionism. While this is not a
radical program, it would represent a significant reform in U.S. foreign
policy.
A strategic, ground-up approach. The neo-Rainbow project cannot be
limited to a formal coalition that comes together around a specific
candidate or set of candidates. Although there will need to be targeted
geographic areas in which it will first take root, this must be a
national project that articulates a compelling social vision aimed at
breaking the isolation of left/progressive activists and movements,
focusing them on strategies for achieving political power. At the same
time, this project must be based in communities, through ward and
precinct organization, bringing together committed activist leaders
(leaders with a small "l") around the mission and vision of the project.
Building the neo-Rainbow project, then, would entail analyzing the power
structures in various communities, understanding the real issues of the
people, linking with community- and workplace-based organizations,
identifying potential candidates for office and the issues around which
they should organize their campaigns, and, ultimately, running for
office.
In the Rainbow movement of the 1980s, we caught a glimpse of what the
new politics could be. It led some to believe that a political
realignment could be brought into existence by the beginning of the 21st
century. For a host of reasons, this did not come to pass. Yet we can
draw upon that movement for far more than inspiration. We can see in the
Rainbow the direction in which our journey must take us. While the road
may look somewhat familiar, it will be a journey to the undiscovered
country - a journey into the future.
SOURCE Indepedent Media Institute
http://www.alternet.org/story/21348/
(c) 2005 Independent Media Institute. All rights reserved.